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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH GERALD MACD·ONALD, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERA CATHERINE MACDONALD 
Appellant and Defendant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7665 
Respondent is not satisfied with appellant's state-
ment of facts, and here m·akes a brief chronological re-
sume of the evidence in the belief it will be of ·consider-
able aid to the court. References in this statement of 
facts are to plaintiff and defendant, who are the re-
spondent and appellant, respectively. 
Joseph Gerald MacDonald, the plaintiff, and Vera 
C. MacDonald, the defendant, were married on June 
15, 1922 in ·Oakland, California (R 45). In 1927 the 
parties moved to Los Gatos, California, for a year ~and 
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a half and then returned to Oakland, and in December 
of 1930 they took up residence in Sacramento (R 76). 
The plaintiff came to Salt Lake City on November 15, 
1945, and was joined by defendant s-ome months later. 
In October, 1946, they purchased their home at 998 
South 15th East (R 45). The defendant had three mis-
carriages preceding the birth of their present child, 
Barbara, who was born in Oakland in 1925 (R 77, 78), 
and is now an adult in a convent (R 45, 79), and not a 
·dependent (R. 108). 
During this period and for the last thirty years 
plaintiff has been employed by the Chicago, Milwaukee, 
St. Paul & Pacific Railroad· Company (R 55). His em-
ployment required him to work away from home on the 
road, except for S~aturdays and Sundays (R 46). He 
is at p-resent its General Agent in Salt Lake City (R 45). 
Defendant first started drinking to excess in 1941, 
four years prior to coming to Salt L'ake. At that time 
the period between drinking bouts was ten days to a 
week and after the parties came to Salt Lake defen-
dant began drinking continuously (R 46). The situa-
tion became more aggravated in 1947 and still worse 
in 1948 and 1949. During the latter period of the mar-
riage, the defendant would drink for two or three 
weeks, until nausea ted; then, after the period of nausea 
had passed, immediately start ·drinking 'again (R 48, 
49, 95, 96). The defendant would wake plaintiff during 
the nights by pounding on his belly, screaming at the 
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top of her voice, kicking the door to his bedroom if he 
closed and locked it (R 51). She acted generally as a 
wild person while under the influence of intoxicants (R 
68). During 1948 'and 1949, plaintiff frequently stayed 
away from home at night in order to get his sleep (R 
106). 
Plaintiff an,d defendant are ·members of the Catho .. 
lie Church. In 1946 the plaintiff sought help from 
Father LaBranch, his Priest, and also consulted with 
Dr. Walker. Dr. Walker recommended the defendant 
be taken to the Mountain View Sanitarium in Salt Lake 
City and the wife entered willingly (R 46, 47)~ The 
defendant was in the sanitarium ·on two occasions dur-
ing this year and remained there about three or four 
weeks (R 64, 65). While there she got hold of some 
whiskey and caused a disturbance and attempted to 
cut her throat (R 47, 48). The defendant was taken to 
the County Hospital after cutting ·herself and there-
'after was taken to the State Mental Hospital where she 
remained ·for thirty days. She was subsequently re-
leased and returned to the parties' home (R 65, 66). In 
February of 1948, the plaintiff left the ·defendant and 
filed an action for divorce. He did this only after con-
sulting with his Priest, who was thoroughly apprised 
of the situation, and because he was unable to rest. and 
do his work properly (R 50, 113). The action was dis-
missed with prejudice on plaintiff's motion on the lOth 
of May, 1948 (R 63, 113). After dismissing the com-
plaint, the plaintiff returned home and lived with de-
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fenda:p.t until October, 1949. The defendant had stated 
that she would stop drinking, but after the parties re-
sumed living together the defendant began drinking 
again (R 69, 70). 
The defendant was, in June 1949, committed to the 
State Mental Hospital for 30 days observation upon 
the plaintiff's affidavit and after he·aring. (Insanity 
Record 6088, R 114, '66-67). There was at that time, 
however, no psychosis (R 110). This action was taken 
by the plaintiff after consulting with Dr. Walker and 
Msgr. McGuire (R 49, 67), 'and during a period when 
defendant had been drinking heavily (R 74). The plain-
tiff visited the defendant at the hospital on Sundays 
and she seemed perfectly normal. She was released 
sometime in July 1949 without plaintiff's knowledge 
and commenced drinking immediately (R 49-50, 70). 
After the defendant was released from the State Men-
tal Hospital, plaintiff and defendant lived together at 
their home in Salt Lake, but plaintiff did not have mari-
tal relations with defendant and had not had such re-
lations for approximately five years. The parties oc-
cupied separate bedrooms (R 68). Plaintiff did not 
forgive defendant for her drinking. From the summer 
of 1949 he tolerated the drinking and did no more than 
live with her and attempt to get her to stop drinking 
(R 70-71-72). 
Plaintiff left defendant in October of 1949, and 
lived elsewhere, but he attempted a further reconcilia-
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tion at Thanksgiving time in November of 1949. His 
attempt was unsuccessful because ·defendant got drunk 
(R 50-51). 
On January 1950, plaintiff filed his complaint for 
divorce commencing this action (R 1). 
Plaintiff testified that he has been to celebrations 
at the clubs he has joined (see below) where it is a 
mixed party, and that he has had drinks with a par-
ticular female; that he has taken this particular woman 
to parties and that he has seen her several times a 
month; that their relationship is one of companionship 
(R 101). Plaintiff has been to her apartment where she 
lives with a daughter and a son; she and her daughter 
have been to plaintiff's apartment for dinner, ~and there 
have been occasions when she has come to plaintiff's 
apartment with him; he gave her a Christmas present 
(R 103). Plaintiff stated this acquaintanceship has 
existed for about a year prior to date of trial (R 102, 
104). 
The testimony and exhibits introduced on the trial 
of this case show the parties' financial condition as fol-
lows: That plaintiff and defendant have acquired a 
home and lot at 998 South 15th East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for which they paid $15,000.00 on O·ctober 1, 1946, 
and that within 90 days of the trial of this cause an 
offer had been made of $13,500.00, which had been re-
jected by the plaintiff (R 53). The plaintiff testified 
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that this house, except for minor repairs, was in good 
condition (R 94). Against the home of the parties is an 
indebtedness of $6,000.00, ·secured by a mortgage to the 
First Security Bank of Utah. The parties have also 
acquired household furnishings in their home of a rea-
sonable value of $2,000.00 (R 56, 84-85). They have ac-
quired a 1949 Hudson two-door sedan of the value of 
$1400.00, against which there is a lien of $212.80 (R 88, 
54). 
As their individual property: The wife received 
during 1950 ;as an inheritance $8,000.00, of which she 
has $6948.25 on deposit at Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany (R 55, Pl. Ex. 1), and the wife has an expectancy 
fr·om her mother's estate; her mother being at the time 
of the trial 82 years of age ( R 56). The plaintiff has 
no bank account or property other than the car and is 
in fact under the following indebtedness: He owes 
$200.00 to his sister for personal loan and he owes 
$135.75 to the Continental National Bank & Trust Com-
pany (R 53-54}. 
Plaintiff testified that his gross earnings are $481.00 
per month, out of which are ·made a -compulsory de-
duction of $18.00 per month for railroad retirement, 
and a deduction for income taxes, reducing his income 
to $387.56 per month (R 52). That the only income he 
has to live on is his salary (R 54). Plaintiff states that 
his work is the solicitation of business from shippers 
and receivers for his railroad in competition with other 
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railroads; that his area includes Wyoming, Oregon, 
eastern Nevada, Utah and Idaho and that he has an ex-
pense account when on the road to cover actual ex-
penses (R 58). This expense account is a maximum of 
$150.00 per month and covers meals, lodging and car 
expenses (R 81-82). His car expen·ses would be $48.00 
to $50.00 per month at six cents per mile (R 82). He 
further testified that he is living in an apartment, eats 
at hotels and restraurants (R 59), and his .meals ·cost 
him approximately $90.00 per month (R 83). He pays 
rent of $54.00 per month and utilities of $10.00 to $12.00 
per month (R 85). He pays $35.00 to $40.00 p·er month 
for clothes and approximately $15.00 for tobacco, liquor, 
etc. Plaintiff testified that the nature of his business 
is such that he must do entertaining not covered by 
company expenses and that he must belong to certain 
clubs and social organizations in connection with his 
business ( R 55, 58, 59, 83). He further testified th·at he 
is required to have an automobile in his business (R 52). 
Plaintiff testified that he had been paying $125.00 
per month temporary alimony since the filing of an 
order to show cause (R 53). That he had been paying 
in addition $7 4.31 on the house loan, except for five 
months, which total of $378.95 he acknowledges he now 
owes to the defendant (R 53, 61, 107). He may option-
ally retire at the age of sixty and is required to retire 
at the age of sixty-five, and that his retirement pay, 
based . on his average earnings, during a particular 
period, would be approximately $125.00 or $126.00 per 
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month (R 60). 
Plaintiff testified that the expenses in maintaining 
the house heretofore mentioned would be $1.75 for light, 
$3.54 for telephone and approximately $5.00 average 
for the gas throughout the year (R 86), plus the mort-
gage payments. 
The plaintiff stated that he is now in good health, 
that he is 54 years of age and that he does not know 
at this time whether or not he will retire at 60 or 65 (R 
89). That his wife is in good health when she is not 
drinking and she has had three physical examinations 
which indicated she was in good physical condition, ex-
cept for her addiction to drink (R 107). He testified 
that his wife is 59 years of age (R 104). 
Based upon the foregoing facts in evidence, the 
trial court made the following findings of fact: That 
for a period of approximately four years defendant 
has been habitually addicted to the use of intoxicating 
beverages and is an habitual drunkard; that defendant 
has periods when she is perfectly competent to act for 
herself and is in possession of all her faculties; that de-
fendant is competent to be sued in this action without ap-
pointment of a guardian; plaintiff has at no time forgiven 
nor condoned defendant's habitual drunkenness; that 
plaintiff has not treated defendant cruelly and he lives 
apart from her with just cause and because of defendant's 
fault; that the parties own a home worth $13,000.00 
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-against which is a lien of $6,000.00 and which, on sale, 
should pay $7,000.00 net proceeds; that the furnishings 
of said home are 'vorth $2,000.00 and defendant has as 
her own funds $6,947.:25; that plaintiff earns $481.80 
per month before dedu-ctions and has no other funds or 
income; that it \Yould be fit and proper to award de-
fendant the home and its furnishings, less one or two 
specified items, a nominal alimony and attorney's fees; 
that plaintiff should be awarded a divorce as provided 
by law and should be awarded the 1949 Hudson auto-
mobile; that should defendant's financial position be-
come such that she is in danger of becoming a public 
charge, the duty of support should fall upon plaintiff 
(R 10, 11, 12). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 
Make More Definite and C·ertain were properly denied. 
2. The Findings of F'a.ct and Conclusions of Law 
are in conformity with the evidence and are supported 
in law. Plaintiff was p-roperly awarded a divorce; the 
awards of property and alimony are proper. 
3. Defendant did not prevail on her ~defense nor 
on her Cross Complaint for separate maintenance or 
divorce. 
4. D·efendant was responsible for her misconduct 
and it was proper that she be sued without a guardian. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for the R·espondent answers the points 
•and aguments of Appellant in a slightly different order 
than as presented in appellant's brief. Respondent pro-
ceeds upon the premise that those points set forth in the 
index to Appellant's brief which are not argued, are 
abandoned, but all points argued by Appellant are 
·answered herein. 
POINT 1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION TO MAKE MO·RE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN 
WERE PRO;PERLY DENIED. (Appellant's Arguments (A) and 
(B).) 
(a) The Complaint need not have been verified. 
The Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in part : 
''Except when otherwise specifically provided 
by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit." I I 
This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in 
conformity with the provisions of 20-2-4.10 U. C. A. 
1943, which is not a delegation of legislative power, but 
an acknowledgment by the State Legislature of the in-
herent authority of the courts to control matters of pro-
cedure by court rule. This statute provides that upon 
the adoption of appropriate . rules of procedure, all 
statutes in conflict therewith shall be of no further force 
and effect. Appellant's cases on the unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative authority to another branch 
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of the state government are not in point .. If the Supreme 
Court, by rule, had attemped to enumerate the grounds 
for divorce, substantive rights of litigants would have 
been affected, but the rule deals only with the form of 
the pleading asserting such a cause of action. 
There can be no doubt that Rule 11, as adopted, 
was intended to reach the provisions of 40-3-4. The 
court is asked to consider the Federal Rule, from which 
has been deleted the words ''or statute'' which follow 
the phrase ''Except when otherwise specifically provided 
oy rnle .... '' By leaving out the exception and the refr,r-
ence to specific statutes requiring pleadings to be veri-
fied, the Supreme Court has obviously intended that the 
only exceptions be those set forth in the rules. 
In any event, the lack of a verified complaint is 
not jurisdictional and can be waived. See Patterson v. 
Patte.rson, 190 Pacific 2d 887, 164 Kan. 501. A motion to 
dismiss based upon the ground that the complaint 
fails to state a cause ·of action does not raise the point 
(R 4). Further, Appellant's Answer, Cross-Complaint 
and Counterclaim are not verified (R 5-8), and this 
cause proceeded to judgment without this matter having 
been previously presented and argued. 
(b) The statement of grounds for divorce was 
sufficient and was definite and certain. 
Paragraph 4 of Respondent's Complaint sets forth 
two grounds for divorce. They are cruelty causing 
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great mental distress and habitual drunkenness (R 1). 
Upon the trial of the cause he abandoned the ground of 
cruelty, he presented no evidence upon this ground ex-
cept as it was pertinent to the ground of habitual drunk-
enness, and no findings were made on cruelty (R 10), 
nor was the decree of divorce based upon such a ground. 
The grounds for divorce as set forth in 40-3-1, sub-
sections 5 and 7, which are habitual drunkenness of the 
defendant, and cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the 
defendant, are equally brief. Respondent has certainly 
pleaded his grounds for divorce with as much certainty 
and definiteness as required by the Complaint set forth 
in Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms, U. R. C. P. It is 
to be noted that these forms are approved as sufficient 
under the provisions of Rule 84. 
Appellant states that she was not properly apprised 
of the comph1.int which ''she should have to meet.'' In 
this regard the Federal Courts in construing their Rule 
12, have uniformly held that a motion for a more difi-
nite statement should only be granted when the informa-
tion sought is necessary to frame a responsive pleading 
and is not for the purpose of preparing for trial. See 
Federal Practice and Procedture, by Barron and Holtz-
off, section 362. Any further particulars which defen-
dant may need in order to prepare for trial should be 
obtained by depositions, interrogatories, and other dis-
covery procedure. See state cases cited on page 687 of 
volume one of the above work. Nearly a year expired 
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between the filing of the complaint and the trial of this 
cause (R 1, 24) in which time such information could 
have been obtained. 
POINT 2. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVI-
DENCE AND ARE SUPPORTED IN LAW. PLAINTIF'F WAS 
PROPERLY AWARDED A DIVO·RCE; THE AWARDS OF 
PROPERTY AND OF ALIMO:NY ARE PROPER. (Appellant's 
Arguments (D , (F) and (H).) 
The evidence in this case clearly reveals the tragedy 
that occurs when a person becomes a chronic alcoholic. 
It also reveals the great patience and conside~ation with 
which the defendant met the daily ·difficulties of mak-
ing a home with defendant. Since 1941 the defendant 
had been drinking excessively· (R 46). Plaintiff sought 
expert medical help to meet this problem. He sought 
the help of his church (R 46-95). He placed the def.en· 
dant in a private sanitarium on two occasions and when 
defendant appeared to b.e about to injure h~rself she 
entered the state mental hospital (R 47, 64), apparently 
voluntarily (See Insanity Record 6088, page 1). After 
seven years of defendant's excessive drinking, in 
February 1948, plaintiff filed for a divorce, but even 
then only after asking for the advice and help of his. 
priest (R 50, 113). Plaintiff reconsidered, dismissed 
his complaint and attempted to make a go of the mar-
riage, but defendant's resumption of her drinking made 
this impossible (R 69, 70). Violence to his person and a 
period of p·articularly heavy drinking caused plaintiff 
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to doubt his wife's sanity. She was ·committed for a 
period of thirty days obs·ervation; during which period 
she was dehydrated and acted normally. But again on 
her return home · she commenced her drinking. Plain-
tiff left the defendant in October, 1949, and yet at~ 
tempted a last reconciliation in N·ovember 1949. During 
this entire period defendant's drinking became pro-
gressively worse and more impossible to deal with (R 
48, 49, 95, 96). 
No possible finding of fact other than habitual 
drunkenness on the part of defendant could have been 
made by the trial ·court. Clearly it is a confirmed habit 
satisfying the requirements of the statute. Holm v. 
Holm, 139 Pacific 937, 44 Utah 242. 
Appellant argues that because plaintiff knew of 
defendant's drinking and lived with her after her con-
finement in a sanitarium and after his filing divorce 
1action that he had forgiven her and condoned her chronic 
drunkenness and cannot now -complain of it. 
It is submitted that forgiveness or condonation are 
not made out on the facts of the case. Further, the dis-
missal of a prior divorce action followed by repeated 
misconduct of a defendant does not constitute condona-
tion. Mayo v. Maryo, 43 Pacific 2d 535, 3 California 2d 
51. Condonation is conditional upon exemplary future 
behavior. Thum v. Thum, 98 Pacific 2d 279, (Colo.), 
and the cas·es therein cited. Forgiveness, if this record 
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disclosed it, would not bar plaintiff from seeking re-
lief where the defendant's misconduct is resumed, and 
the law permits the injured party to ass·ert all the P'rior 
misconduct, as well as that occurring subsequent to the 
ineffective condonation. Thum v. Thum, supra; Lassen 
v. Lassen, 7 Pacific 2d 120, 134 Kan. 436; Burt v. Burt, 
72 Pacific 2d 524, 48 Wy.oming 19; Arnold v. Arnold, 174 
Pacific 2nd 674, 76 Cal. App. 2d 877. 
Apparently neither of the parties had any con-
siderable amount of property at the time of their mar-
riage. The wife at that time was not employed and 
lived with her parents (R 77). She brought no property 
to the marriage (R 76, 77). The property accu~ulate~ 
by the parties was purchased from the earnings of pl~ain­
tiff, with the exception of two or three hundred dollars 
the defendant contributed to the purchase of a home 
in Sacramento, California (R 77, 99) which occurred 
sometime in the 1930s. 
As set forth in the foregoing statement of facts, 
the parties have as their joint property, $13,500.00, less 
a $6,000.00 mortgage, in a hou8e; $2,000.00 in fuTnish-
ings; $1400.00, less a lien of $212.80, in a ear. Plain-
tiff has no separate estate. Defendant has $6948.25 on 
deposit and a substantial expectancy in her mother's 
estate. 
The net value of the joint estate as found by the 
court is approximately $10,200.00 (h.ouse, car, furnish-
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ings). Of this amount, $9,000.00 was awarded to the de-
fendant and $1200.00 to the plaintiff. Combined with 
her separate estate the defendant has $16,000.00 in pro-
perty and cash, approximately. 
The plaintiff's net is the $1200.00 in the car and his 
net worth is reduced by the amount of the debts he has 
accumulated during the period he was paying on the 
mortgage and the temporary alimony. In addition to 
this, defendant was :awarded attorney's fees of $250.00, 
although there was absolutely nothing in the record to 
show a need or inability of defendant to pay her own 
attorney. Defendant was further awarded a nominal 
a~imony for the purpose of placing her future needs, 
if any arise, upon plaintiff (R 12-15). 
The record discloses that defendant's health is not 
good but that she is in good health when not drinking 
(R 107). Counsel for appellant asserts in his brief that 
she is now in a hospital, but there is no such evidence 
before the trial court, and this court should refuse to 
consider this matter as the full extent of her disability 
and prospects of recovery cannot be ascertained. In 
any event, plaintiff concedes that the possibility of de-
fendant becoming gainfully employed is slim if not non-
existent and that the situation is, therefore, not materi-
ally changed. 
· Plaintiff is employed and e1arning $481.00 gross 
per month, after deductions, $387.56 per month (R 52). 
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He has expenses per month of meals $90.00, rent $59.00, 
utilities $10.00 to $12.00, clothes $35.00 to $40.00, mis-
cellaneous amounts for cigarettes and liquor, etc. $15.00 
(R 83, 85) and in addition to this he must make car pay-
ments of $53.10 (R 82) for he is required to have a car 
(R 52) 'and he has entertainment expenses for which he 
is not compensated (R 55, 58, 59. 83). As always there 
are amounts paid out which cannot readily be accounted 
for which will come out of plaintiff's earnings and there 
is the need for plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, the back 
alimony ~and the five months back mortgage payments. 
The effect of the temporary order for support money 
was to take all of plaintiff's savings and reduce him to 
the device of getting small loans to meet cuTrent ex-
penses (R 88). 
Appellant misstates the record when she asserts 
that upon retirement plaintiff will have no income. The 
evidence was that he will have an income of $125.00 or 
$126.00 per month (R '60) and that he could take other 
work at that time if it was not connected with a rail-
road (R 89). It does not follow that a future need of 
the defendant will not he met because of a decrease in 
plaintiff's earnings, although his earnings will undoubt-
edly decline. 
A plain inference from the facts and an undoubted 
consideration of the trial court was the expense of the 
purchase of liquor by defendant for the years of her 
excessive drinking (R 89, 90). With plaintiff constantly 
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on the road it would have been impossible for him to re-
fuse to give defendant control over some of the family 
funds 1and she had a joint checking account (R 46, 89). 
The defendant was ·clearly at fault. It is her mis-
conduct, continuing over many years. which has caused 
this marriage· to fail. During the latter period of the 
marriage the defendant failed completely to perform 
her wifely duties ~~.round the parties' home. (R 96, 97). 
This court has held that whatever doubt there may be 
concerning a property settlement, "it ought to be re .. 
solved against the guilty party whose fault and wrongs 
and breaches of the marital relation destroyed the home 
and forced or brought about the separation. Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg, 292 Pacific 214, 77 Utah 137. 
Appellant contends that a guilty party may still be 
awarded alimony and cites the provisions of 40-3-5 as 
opposed to the provisions of 40-3-9, U. C. A. 1943. Re-
spondent has no serious quarrel with the proposition 
that in a proper case such an award can be made. It 
would be well to consider the cases where the problem 
has ·come up. Appellant cites three: Schuste.r v. Schuster, 
53 Pacific 2d 428, 58 Utah 257; Woolley v. Woolley, 195 
Pacific 2nd 743, 113 Utah 391; Greener v. Greener, 212 
P-acific 2nd 194, (Utah). 
~Greener v. ,Greener is not in point. No divorce was 
granted in this case and no alimony -awarded. In Schuster 
v. Schuster, alimony in the fixed sum of $1500.00 was 
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awarded to the plaintiff-wife who was also awarded 
the divorce. Obviously under the court decision, she 
was not at fault. In Woolley v. Woolley, the defendant-
husband was awarded a divorce, the wife was given ap.;. 
proximately one-third of the accumulated property and 
the trial ·court was ordered to retain jurisdiction so that 
the wife could realize her share of the increase in value, 
if any, of certain speculative mining interests awarded 
to the husband. This latter arrangement could be more 
accurately characterized as a property division with 
provisions for a future adjustment. It is hardly the 
payment of alimony as it is usually understood. 
T1aking the tests and manner of dividing the p·ro-
perty in the Woolley case, and applying them here, a 
division of the net joint estate would result in defen-
dant taking approximately $3400.00 and the plaintiff 
$6800.00. The plaintiff only received $1200.00 and the 
defendant received $9,000.00 under the decision in thisj 
case. Defendant, therefore, received a $5600.00 ad-
vantage from the property division. At $100.00 alimony 
per month it would be 56 months before she would have 
the equivalent; and this does not account for the earn-
ings on the sum she now has the use of for this period. 
At $75.00 per month it would be 7 4% months before 
she would receive the equivalent. Undoubtedly the trial 
court considered these matters before making the awards 
in this case. 
Under no case or authority in this state is the de-. 
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fendant entitled to a majority share of the accumulated 
property plus a substantial award of alimony. A fair 
division of the property would be as stated in the lW ool-
ley case, supra, at page 745, Pacific Reports: 
"In determining generally what a wife is en-
titled to when a divorce decree has been granted 
to the husband, we have considered one-third 
as being a fair proposition.'' 
The difficulty of doing justice between litigants in 
a divorce suit as to the division of property and the 
awarding of alimony is undoubtedly one of the greatest 
problems to ·confront a court, trial or appellate. Each 
case must be considered on its own facts. Dahlberg ·v. 
Dahlberg, supra; Allen v. Allen, 165 Pacific 2d 872 at 
875, 109 Utah 99, and the ·cases and texts therein cited. 
Elements to consider ·can be set forth, Pifnion v. Pinion, 
67 Pacific 2d 265, 92 Utah 255, but in the final analysis a 
solution is dependent upon the exercise of a sound judi-
cial discretion. Though the rule may have once been 
otherwise, an appellate court will not substitute its judg-
ment for the trial court, and unless there is a clear 
abuse of discretion, the lower court's decision will be 
affirmed; Anderson v. Anderson, 138 Pacific ~d 252, 104 
Utah 104; Allen v. Allen, supra, and cases therein cited. 
Appellant raises many arguments as to future con-
tingencies which are highly speculative. The uncertain-
ties, of the effect of a divorce decree upon the litigants, 
under future conditions are inherent in any divorce 
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action; and this is the reason modification under ch!anged 
circumstances is permitted. Further, a court cannot 
consider separately any one factor, but must look at the 
whole of the case. 
A careful consideration of the lower court's de-
cision in this cause reveals that a ·lion's share of the 
joint property was awarded to defendant, although she 
might well have not been entitled to it; that this award 
was made in lieu of any substantial alimony payments; 
that the court considered this p-roperty, in addition to 
defendant's separate estate, should care for defendant 
for a considerable period of time as stated, approxi-
mately ten years. 
Whether or not the finding of ten years is correct, 
the principle is the same, because the court further pro-
vided defendant with a nominal alimony to protect her 
in future circumstances. The plaintiff, on the other 
hand, who has not been at fault, is given a $1200.00 as-
set, the car, has no further interest in the joint estate, 
is saddled with substantial debts, private and under the 
decree, and has only his salary left to him. This is what 
the plaintiff takes after contributing his all to the miar-
riage through the twenty-nine years of its existence. 
It is ·submitted that the decree is more than fair to de-
fendant. 
The trial court having found the foregoing awar,ds: 
to be fair, just and equitable, it follows, of course, that 
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the Conclusions of Law and the Decree should be in con-
formity with said Findings, as they are (R 12-15). 
POINT 3. DEFENDANT DID NOT PREVAIL ON HER 
DEFENSE, NOR ON HER CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR SEPA-
RAT'E MAINTANCE OR DIVORCE. (Appellant's Argument 
(E) and (G).) 
What respondent has previously stated about the 
evidence, and particularly the matters first set forth in 
P·oint 2 of his argument 'are applicable here. It is sub-
mitted the plaintiff w.as justified in living separate and 
apart from defendant and he did so because of her fault. 
There is no evidence that he failed to support her, to 
·the contrary that he permitted her to draw on his bank 
account (R 89, 93) and has paid her temporary alimony 
pending trial. The necessary elements set forth in Sec-
tion 40-4-1 U. C. A. 1943 .providing for ~eparate main-
tenance were not proved. 
Defendant was permitted 'at the. time of trial to 
amend her cross complaint to state grounds for a divorce, 
though an amended. pleading or written pleading was 
not filed and none appears in the record. The evidence 
·upon which defendant ·contends she was entitled to a 
divorce, 'as we understand it, is that plaintiff signed an 
affidavit of insanity against defendant, that he had filed 
a prior divorce action, and that during the year preced-
ing the trial of this cause he had 'a companionable re-
lationship with another woman. The evidence on this 
latter point is contained in 4 pages of the transcript (R 
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101-104), and we submit that there is nothing therein 
contained which could be construed as being grounds 
for divorce in favor of defendant. Furthermore, there 
is no showing that plaintiff ever did anything improper, 
or that his conduct caused defendant any distress. And 
the entire relationship, such as it is, occurred only after 
plaintiff had separated from defendant in November 
1949, and had only been in existence for approximately 
~a year prior to the date of trial, January 10, 1951 (R 
101-104), showing conclusively that it was in no wise the 
cause of defendant's long continuing p·rior mis-conduct. 
As to the filing of the prior divorce case, a reading 
of the record discloses that this was done with great 
reluctance and after consultation by plaintiff with his 
priest (R 50). There is not a scintill~a of evidence that 
the matters therein alleged were false, and undoubtedly 
at that time a valid cause of action for ·divorce existed 
in plaintiff. He cannot be penalized for exercising a 
right that the law gives him. 
What has been sa~d of the prior divorce action is 
true of the insanity affidavit. The evidence ·clearly 
shows that this step was taken in good faith after asking 
the advice of the f~amily priest and the defendant's 
physician ( R 67, 68). 
POINT 4. DEFENDANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
HER MISCONDUCT AND IT WAS PROPER THAT SHE BE 
SUED WITHO·UT A GUARDIAN. (Appellant's Arguments (C), 
(1), (J), and (K).) 
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This 'action was commenced by filing a complaint 
on January 19, 1950 (R 1). ·The case was not tried un-
til January 10, 1951 (R 24). During the intervening 
p·eriod a hearing was had on an Order to Show Cause, 
and the defendant was then present and testified (R 
91). At no time during this period did defendant con-
tend she wa;s insane or required a guardian to appear 
in this action. The motion for guardian ad litem was 
first made on the morning of trial (R 37) but counsel 
at that time was more concerned with obtaining her 
presence than anything else and first asked for a bench 
warrant (R 25, 27, 28). The trial court offered to ap-
point a guardian ad litem forthwith and proceed with 
the trial, but ·counsel for ·defendant wanted the defen-
dant present (R 31), and further urged that the guardi-
an should make a report to the court (R 31, 33). Court 
and ·counsel 1agreed that ·counsel and plaintiff should 
go to the family home and see defendant and report to 
the court (R 34, 35). As. a consequence, a report was 
made to the court that the defendant knew of the hear-
ing, refused to appear, and entrusted her cause to her 
lawyer (R 36, 37). Motion for ~a guardian ad litem was 
reasserted, resisted on the showing then made, and 
denied by the court on the ground that a guardian could 
do nothing to protect defendant's interest that couldn't 
be accomplished by her counsel (R 37, 38). 
Prior to the ruling on this motion there were three 
matters, in addition to the report of counsel, put before 
the trial court. They were the Insanity Record 6088 
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(R 30), the stipulation as to Dr. R. A. D~a,rke's testi-
mony (R 34, 110) which was to the effect that at the 
tiine he examined defendant and at the hearing before 
Judge Ellett there was no evidence of psychosis, and, 
third, the representation by counsel for the defendant 
that defendant had been absent from the Utah State 
Hospital for some time, and had even been out of town 
(R 25). The evidence on the hearing of this matter 
showed that defendant had been absent from the hospital 
for eighteen months following her release and prior to 
trial. 
The physician's certificate in the Insanity Record 
contains the clinical record of the defendant. It shows 
that she has no physical defects, that her orientation 
is correct, that her memory is good as to recent events., 
her mood is pleasant and coopera,tive, she has no de-
lusions or hallucinations, she is rational, that she is 
dangerous to self, and the probable cause of patient's 
illness is alcoholic degeneration; on diagnosis there :are 
no entries after the various mental diseases, but the 
words ''alcohol addiction'' are indieated. Following 
the words ''psychosis undiagnosed'' is the term ' 'alco-
holism with suicidal tendencies.'' Following this in the 
form are the signatures of R. A. Darke and V. M. Sevy, 
doctors. It is to be remembered Dr. Darke's testimony, 
contained in the stipulation (R 110), was to the effect 
that notwithstanding this certificate the p'atient was not 
psychotic at the time he examined her. The writer sug-
gests that Dr. Sevy's testimony would have been to the 
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same effect. The court found defendant insane and 
committed her to the Utah State Hospital for thirty-
day observation. It is to be noted that this antiquated 
form is made for the p,ermanent commitment of a pa-
tient and contains no provision for temporary commit-
ment as provided in Section 85-7-17, U.C.A. 1943, as 
amended in 1945, which section does not provide for a 
finding of insanity by the District Judge until notifica-
tion that p'atient is insane by the Medical Superinten-
dent of Utah State Hospital, and provides only for com-
mitment on a thirty-day observation basis. An ex-
amination of the form reveals that Judge Ellett made 
the insertion that this commitment was ''for 30 day 
observation period.'' 
Also contained in the file is a letter of Owen P. 
Heninger, the Medical Superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital, a state officer under the provisions of Sec-
tion 85-7-11, which letter is addressed to Judge A. H. 
Ellett and refers to a prior communication between 
these two. This letter st,ates that the defendant was re-
leased because no p.sychosis W'as found. The date of 
letter referred to is not shown, but the evidence conclu-
sively shows that said release occurred about three 1 1 
weeks after the commitment (R 67) and that the de-
fendant took up her residence again with plaintiff in 
July of 1949 (R 70). There is no question that defen-
dant has lucid intervals of two or three days, as stated 
in defendant's brief, when she has drunk to a point of 
saturation and is then nausea ted ( R 4 7). There is 1also 
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no question that she is completely normal when she 
ceases drinking (R. 96). Plaintiff saw her at the Utah 
State Hospital on several occasions when she had been 
without intoxicants and she was quite normal (R 49, 
50). 
Section 85-7-17, as amended in 1945, supra, is the 
only provision dealing with the judicial commitment of 
a person on a temporary b,asis, ,and is undoubtedly the 
section the court "\vas acting under in regard to defen-
dant's commitment in June of 1949, as shown by this 
record. This section provides: 
''Temporary Commitments-Discharge-Fur-
ther Proceedings. 
"Upon the filing of a verified application al-
leging that a person is in such mental condition 
that his commitment to the hospital is necessary 
for his proper care or observation, if such per-
son is fonnd by two duly licensed· physicians to 
be in such mental condition, he may be com-
mitted by any district judge having jurisdiction, 
to the hospit~al for a period of thirty days pend-
ing the determination of his mental condition. 
Within thirty days after such commitment the 
superintendent of the hospital shall discharge 
him, if he is not insane, and shall so notify the 
judge who committed him or, if he is insane, he 
shall report the patient's mental condition to the 
judge with the recommendation that he be com-
mitted as ~an insane person, or discharged to the 
care of his guardian, relatives or friends, if he 
is harmless and can properly be cared for by 
them. Within said thirty days the committing 
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judge may authorize a discharge as afores'aid, 
or he may commit the patient to the institution as 
an insane person, if in his opinion such commit-
ment is necessary. If in the opinion of the 
judge additional medical evidence as to the men-
tal condition of the alleged insane person is de-
sirable, he may appoint a physician to further 
examine him and report thereon~'' 
(Italics ours) 
As seen above, this statute provides a commitment 
for observation for the purpose of determining, in doubt-
ful cases, the mental condition of a patient. The find-
ing of insanity, or lack of ins1anity of the patient, is 
made by the Medical Superintendent of the Utah State 
Hospital. If sane the patient must be discharged. If in-
sane the Superintendent makes his recommendation and 
the District Judge acts appropriately under the l~atter 
provision of the statute. If no phychosis is found, as is 
the fact in the insanity' proceeding under question in 
the p-resent case before this court, the Superintendent 
shall ''notify'' the judge of that fact. The letter in the 
Insanity Record is such notification and clearly shows 
that under the above p-rocedure the Medical Superinten-
dent found the defendant sane and diseharged her. 
It is to be noted that the procedure for definite com-
mitment is provided in Section 85-7-18 and the sections 
following and this procedure is entirely different than 
that followed in regard to the defendant. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, which we 
believe is controlling in this case, if this court concludes 
that the commitment of the defendant was on a perma-
nent basis then we submit the following: 
That under provisions of 85-7-11, as amended in 
1945, the Medical Superintendent has the following duty: 
"He shall . . . . -discharge such of them (pa-
tients) as, in his judgement are no longer in need 
of care and treatment by the hospital staff. He 
shall immediately notify the judge of the dis-
trict from which the patient was committed, the 
fact of his discharge. If in the judgment of the 
superintendent a patient so discharged has re-
covered his reason, he shall certify to the judge 
of the fact of his recovery, whereupon the judge 
shall immediately enter an order restoring the 
patient to competency.'' 
That the letter contained in the Insanity Record is 
such a certificate. See Black's Law Dictionary which de-
fines a certificate as follows : 
''Certificate. A written assurance, or official 
representation, that some act has or has not been 
done, or some event occurred, or some legal 
formality been complied with. 
''A 'certificate' by a public officer is a state-
ment written and signed, but not necessarily or 
customarily sworn to, which is by law made evi-
dence of the truth of the facts stated for all or 
for certain purposes. 
''A writing by which testimony is given that 
a fact has or has not taken place.'' 
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There is no order in the Insanity Record by the 
judge, but in the absence of a showing to the contrary, 
the judge and the Medical Superintendent are presumed 
to have done their official and legal duty. 20 American 
Jurisprudence on Evidenc-e, Section 170, and cases there 
cited. Legally, therefore, the trial court must have con-
cluded that such an order was made and that the de-
fendant was restored to capacity at the time of her re-
lease. 
·On the evidence and the law above related, the trial 
court in this case should have found that defendant 
was sane at all times, and in any event, the trial court 
would be compelled to find that the defendant was sane 
at the time of her release in July of 1949 and had been 
ever smce. 
As to defendant's claimed incompetency, other than 
the asserted insanity, to be sued in this action, the de-
fendant raises two matters: One that defendant is in-
toxicated for long periods extending up to three weeks, 
and, two, that shortly after the decision in this case, 
the defendant was adjudged incompetent to handle her 
property because of her habitual drunkenness. Plain-
tiff petitioned the court for the appointment of a gen-
eral guardian of the estate of defendant in the belief 
that she would very likely squander a large part of her 
separate estate, which was cash, and also the proceeds 
from the sale of the family home in the event it was sold, 
during a period in which she was intoxicated, and be-
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cause, generally, he felt that she might well be deceived 
or imposed upon by artful or designing persons. This 
was a step taken for defendant's own benefit. Defendant, 
and her counsel here, resisted the appointment of such 
general guardian, filing an ans,Yer to plaintiff's petition, 
demanding a trial, and contesting the matter at the hear-
ing. The defendant and her counsel at that time and in 
that incompetency proceeding took the position that 
the defendant 'vas not incompetent; that she was capable 
of handling her own separate property, and that she 
was not in need of a. guardian of any sort, either of her 
person, or her estate, or to represent her in any legal 
actions. See Probate File No. 33120, in the Matter of 
the Guardianship of the Estate of Vera Catherine Mac-
Donald, and yet, in this proceeding, the defendant has 
taken an altogether different stand. 
Plaintiff concedes that the defendant is in need of 
aid, direction and control of her property and concedes 
that she is incompetent to manage and handle it her-
self, but plaintiff asserts that, notwithstanding the fore-
going, it was proper for the defendant to be sued in 
the divorce action before this court without the app·oint-
ment of a guardian ad litem. The record shows, as 
stated above, that the primary concern of the defen-
dant and her counsel was for defendant to be present 
at the trial. There is no way that a guardian ad litem 
could as-sure this being done and in the event that a 
guardian ad litem had been appointed, the matter would 
have proceeded exactly .as it did. It was a contested 
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proceeding, with defendant's counsel fully protecting 
defendant's rights throughout. The trial court, being 
aware of the situation, allowed counsel for the defen-
dant full opportunity to present any matters which he 
cared to and permitted a full hearing on the merits of 
this case. The only specific proposition which defen-
dant's counsel urged ~as a need for a guardian ad litem 
was that such a guardian could make a report to the 
court on the possibility of defendant appearing in court 
(R 31, 33). The court permitted a recess so that counsel 
for both sides eould apprise themselves of this situation 
and rep·ort personally to the court in regard to this 
matter (R 35). Defendant in her brief fails to state or 
put forth any matter that would have been handled dif-
ferently, or any evidence that would have been put be-
fore the court had a guardian been appointed, nor does 
she in .any w:ay suggest anything that was done that in 
any way, prejudiced her trial in this matter, nor does 
she contend that the result would have been otherwise 
had a guardian ad litem been present in her behalf. 
It does not follow that because defendant is quite 
frequently intoxicated that she is incompetent to de-
fend a law suit, although such drunkenness may indicate 
she is unable to care for her property. The law recog-
nizes many different degrees of capacity from idiocy, 
to :a person insane, to the lack of capacity' to handle 
affairs in the competitive business world, to a lack of 
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of property, 
and so on. Drunkenness does not fall in any of these 
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catagories because the status is wilful and voluntary 
and can be avoided. And during periods of sobriety the 
character of the person is entirely changed. But habitual 
drunkenness certainly satifies the provisions of Section 
102-13-20, U.C.A. 1943, which provides: 
''The "\Yords 'incompetent,' 'mentally incom-
petent' and 'incap·able,' as used in this title, shall 
be construed to mean any person who, though 
not insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weak-
ness of mind, or from amy other cause, unable, 
unassisted, to properly manage :and take care 
of himself or his property, and by reason thereof 
would be likely to be deceived or imp·osed upon 
by artful or designing persons." · 
(Italics ours) 
The trial of a cause long set should not be postponed 
nor should the courts go through idle gestures to pro-
tect a person who is voluntarily intoxicated and who, 
after notice, deliberately refuses to be present in court, 
particularly where such person has adequate representa-
tion by an attorney. 
In any event, the failure to appoint a guardian ad 
litem does not make this proceeding void .and is at most 
an irregularity. Neilsen v. 'Emerson, 9 Pacific 2d 260 
(Cal.) at page 262. And the subsequent adjudication 
of the defendant incompetent does not m·ake the pro-
ceeding void. In the case of Sterling v. Goulden,- 12 
Pacific 2d 812 (Kans.), wherein the plaintiff was ad-
judged incompetent a month after judgment was ren-
dered against her, and for whom a guardian was ap-
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ment was not void and refused to set it aside. It is inter-
esting to note that the basis of the incompetency, as set 
forth by the court, was acts and conduct of the party 
antedating the trial of the cause in which the judgment 
was taken against her, which is the same as in this pro-
ceeding. 
The general rule in the United States is that a court 
has jurisdiction to enter a judgment against an insane 
defendant and that the proceeding and judgment are not 
void .. 28 American Jurisprudence, Insane and other in-
competent persons, Section 103, et seq. Where the vali-
dity of the judgment rendered is raised, the courts are 
primarily concerned with whether or not the proceed-
ing was open, adverse, devoid of fraud and whether or 
not the party's interests were adequately protected and 
she was given a fair and impartial trial. 34 American 
Law Reports 221, at 223. As to the present case the 
court's attention is called to the fact that this was not a 
default matter, nor is there any claim of fraud, preju-
dice or unfairness in the trial. 
As we ha.ve stated above, the trial court having pro-
perly found the defendent to be sane, it follows that she 
must have been responsible for her misconduct. Re-
spondent .agrees with the proposition of law put forth 
by appellant, that an insane party cannot be held re-
sponsible for misconduct which occurs during the period 
of insanity, which would ordinarily give rise to a cause 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
of action for divorce, but here there is absolutely no 
sho·w-ing that the defendant's drinking started during 
a period of insanity, nor that she was insane during 
any substantial period of her drinking, if at all, or that 
her drinking w·as anything but voluntary. And, of course, 
if habitual drunkenness is made a ground for divorce 
by the Legislature, as it is, a person guilty of su-ch mis-
conduct cannot assert that she is not responsible for her 
habitual drunkenness because she is intoxicated or drunk 
or cannot control her drinking. 
It, therefore, further follows that the court's Find-
ings and Conclusions in regard to these matters were 
proper. 
The record in this case discloses that the plaintiff 
had a long and trying experience in his attempts to deal 
with his wife's .addiction to intoxicants; that he met this 
difficulty, which lasted over a period of ten years prior 
to trial, with the utmost patience and consideration until 
finally the situation became intolerable; and that now 
he is deprived of nearly all the accumlation of property 
made during the course of the marriage. His conduct 
is most unusual in comparison with the usual fact situa-
tion coming before the courts in a divorce proceeding 
and he endured the conduct of his .spouse long after 
many another husband would have given up. The record 
further discloses that the awards of family property 
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were more than fair to the defendant, that they are sub-
stantially greater than would ordinarily he given to a 
wife not at fault. That these awards in conjunction 
with her separate estate will care for her for a consider-
able period of time and even if she should have future 
needs, she has the right and opportunity to again call 
upon plaintiff for a modification of the nominal alimony 
award. This case was presented with vigor and resource .. 
fulness by defendant's counsel and defendant's rights 
were fully protected at the trial. 
That the judgment and decree of the trial court 
should be affirmed is respectfully submitted. 
E. C. JENSEN 
JOHN H. SNOW 
ROBERT JOHN. JENSEN 
Attorneys for R:espondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
